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NOTES
Aggravated Assaults with Chairs versus Guns:
Impermissible Applied Double Counting Under the
Sentencing Guidelines
Carolyn Barth

INTRODUCTION

In a bar called Andrea's Attic, David and Victor were having a
drink when they got into an argument. The argument escalated until
Victor said something that infuriated David. David looked at Victor,
and, wanting to hurt Victor, grabbed the nearest object, a chair, and
then threw it at Victor. The chair hit Victor and he fell to the ground,
but was not hurt.1
In a bar called Barb's Barn down the street, Valerie was having a
drink. Dorothy walked into the bar, grabbed Valerie by the arm and
dragged her outside onto the street. As Valerie was dragged, she saw
that Dorothy gripped a gun in her hand. On the street, Dorothy
pointed the gun at Valerie and yelled, "You are going to die." Then
Dorothy waved the gun in the air, threatening to fire it at the bar, at
the sky, at Valerie, but never fired. Then, after holding Valerie at gun
point for five minutes, Dorothy hit Valerie on the back of the head,
pistol whipping her, so that she fell to the ground. Valerie was not in
jured.
Currently, in most federal circuits, despite the fact that Dorothy
threatened Valerie with a brandished gun that she carried into the bar
with her while David picked up the nearest chair and threw it without
brandishing or threatening, David and Dorothy will receive the same
sentence for their crimes. Courts hold that each committed an aggra
vated assault while "otherwise using"2 a dangerous weapon under the
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines" or
"USSG"), but because neither committed another felony during the

1. The example of an aggravated assault with a chair is based on the facts of United
States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992), in which the defendant struck a fellow in
mate at a reformatory with a metal chair.
2. The term "otherwise used" means "conduct [that] did not amount to the discharge of
a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dan
gerous weapon." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n.l(g) (1998)
[hereinafter "USSG"]. This Note discusses in detail the meaning and application of the term.
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assault, and neither victim was seriously injured, courts will treat each
the same under the Guidelines.3
Courts should sentence David and Dorothy differently because
David did not "otherwise use" the chair to commit the aggravated as
sault, and, in fact, it was only his "use" of the chair that qualified him
for aggravated assault as opposed to simple assault.4 On the other
hand, Dorothy qualified for the aggravated assault Guideline because
she possessed a gun, and then, when she pistol whipped Valerie, she
"otherwise used" the gun.5 This Note addresses the sentencing issues
presented by these contrasting examples and argues that courts should
sentence defendants like David, who used a chair, more leniently than
defendants like Dorothy, who used a gun.
In the 1980s Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
("Act")6 to improve the federal system for sentencing federal defen
dants. Through the Act, Congress created the United States Sentenc
ing Commission ("Commission"). 7 The Act directed the Commission
to establish specific guidelines for federal sentencing.8 The Commis
sion thereby drafted the Guidelines to eliminate unwarranted sen
tencing disparities between similarly situated defendants. The Com
mission's articulated goals were to produce uniformity and
proportionality in sentencing.9 As of November 1, 1987,10 the

3. The relevant portions of the USSG provisions discussed in this Note are reproduced
as follows:
§ 2A2.2. Aggravated Assault
a) Base Offense Level: 15
b) Specific Offense Characteristics

(2)(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels; (B) if a dangerous weapon (in
cluding a firearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a dangerous weapon
(including a firearm) was brandished or its use was threatened, increase by 3 levels.
USSG § 2A2.2. Application Note 1 defines "aggravated assault" as "a felonious assault that
involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten),
or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony." USSG § 2A2.2, cmt.
n.l.
4. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2.
5. See infra Sections l.B.1 and I.B.2.
6. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 356166, 3571-74, 3581-86; 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-98 (1994)).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a).
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 (a), (b)(l).
9. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also Tung Yin, Comment, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using
Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement In Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines,

83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 429 (1995).
10. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis,
40 EMORY L.J. 393, 394 (1991).
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Guidelines bound federal courts to follow them when sentencing per
sons convicted of federal crimes.1 1
Courts determine a sentence under the Guidelines by applying fac
tors on a matrix. Each factor corresponds to a number called a "level,"
and courts add or subtract levels according to the facts of the case and
the defendant's criminal history. A sentencing court calculates a sen
tence by finding the intersection on the matrix of the "base offense
level"12 of the conviction and the defendant's "criminal history cate
gory." 1 3 Once the court identifies this intersection it fine tunes the sen
tence by applying any applicable "specific offense characteristics,"14
each with a different level.15 The court can then further fine tune the
result by applying upward or downward adjustments.16 In the end, the
court arrives at a level that corresponds to a certain number of months
in prison.
For example, consider the aggravated assault Guideline for a de
fendant with no criminal history.1 7 The base offense level for aggra
vated assault18 is a level 15.19 A court may add levels for applicable
specific offense characteristics. For example: If a firearm was dis11. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2). For a helpful description of how a judge calculates a fed
eral sentence under the Guidelines, see Daniel I. Smulow, Comment, When Fair Is Foul:
Federal Drug Sentencing in the Wake ofUnited States v. LaBonte, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
437, 437 n.3 (1998).
12. "Base offense level" is the conduct accounted for in the elements of a charged of
fense of which a defendant is convicted, or to which he pied guilty. The Guidelines do not
track the purely statutory language of the elements in the base offense levels, rather they are
descriptions of generic conduct. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a). A court locates the appropriate
"base offense levels" in Chapter 2 of the Guidelines. See Erich D. Andersen, Enhancement
for "Abuse of a Position of Trust" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 70 OR. L. REV.
181, 186 n.23 (1991).
13. The defendant's "criminal history" is based on factors relating to the defendant's
prior sentences. A defendant will receive a longer sentence depending on the number and
types of prior sentences he has served. See USSG § 4Al.l.
·

14. "Specific offense characteristics" are those characteristics specific to the defendant's
conduct or harm that Congress has determined to be aggravating or mitigating factors of a
crime. An example of a specific offense characteristic is the possession of a gun during the
commission of an offense. See Andersen, supra note 12, at 186 n.24. This Note will use the
terms "specific offense characteristic" and "enhancement" interchangeably.
15. See Smulow, supra note 11, at 437 n.3.
16. "Upward and downward adjustments" are those characteristics of the defendant's
conduct or harm that are not specific to the crime, but yet are aggravating or mitigating fac
tors. These adjustments take account of, among other things, the defendant's role in the of
fense and status of the victim. See USSG §§ 3Al.1-Bl.4.
17. This Note does not discuss criminal history because it would add unnecessary com
plications in the context of this discussion.
18. The base offense level "aggravated assault" is defined in the Guidelines as "a feloni
ous assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not
merely to frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony."
USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.l.
19. See USSG § 2A2.2(a).
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charged - increase by 5 levels; if a dangerous weapon (including a fire
arm) was otherwise used20 - increase by 4 levels; if a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was brandished or threatened - increase
by 3 levels.21 If a defendant otherwise used a dangerous weapon to
commit aggravated assault, a court would properly find that he is sub
ject to a sentence corresponding to 19 levels.
A defendant might challenge the resulting sentence if a court were
to count any aspect of his conduct twice when applying the factors on
the matrix. "Double counting" occurs when a court applies the Guide
lines in a way that accounts for the same aspects of a defendant's con
duct more than once to increase the severity of a sentence.22 A court
might double count, for instance, if it applied a base offense level with
a specific offense characteristic under one provision of the Guidelines,
and subsequently enhanced that sentence by applying another provi
sion or enhancement based on the same conduct accounted for in the
first specific offense characteristic.23
For example, consider a defendant who commits a robbery by re
moving the cashier from behind the counter and tying him up in the
bathroom. The court sentences the robber for the base offense level
"robbery" and the specific offense characteristic "robbery involving
restraint of the victim."24 If the court also sentences the defendant for
abducting the cashier under the enhancement providing: "If any per
son was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense . . . increase
by 4 levels,"25 the defendant might claim that the court impermissibly
counted the same conduct (tying up the cashier in the bathroom)
twice: once for the restraint and once for the abduction.
The success of a defendant's claim that a court double counted is
not uniform throughout the federal circuits. The circuits uniformly
consider double counting impermissible where the Guideline provision
20. ·See supra note 2 (defining "otherwise used").
21. See USSG §§ 2A2.2(b)(2)(A)-(C).
22. See United States v. Parker, 136 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (" 'Double counting'
occurs when the Guidelines use the same conduct more than once to increase the severity of
a sentence."); see also Gary Swearingen, Comment, Proportionality and Punishment: Double
Counting Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 68 WASH. L. REV. 715, 718-20 (1993).
23. See supra note 22; see also Hideaki Sano, Note, Judicial Abuse of "Process": Exam
ining the Applicability of Section 2Fl.1 (b)(4)(B) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
Bankruptcy Fraud, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1038, 1058 (2000) (citing United States v. Campbell,
967 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1992) for the proposition that double counting occurs when courts
consider the same factor in setting the initial Guidelines range and in choosing to depart
from that range; and United States v. Lincoln, 956 F.2d 1465, 1471 (8th Cir. 1992) for finding
double counting "when one instance . . . of a defendant's conduct forms the basis for a con
viction . . . and is also employed to adjust one or more other sentences").
24. The base offense level is "Robbery." USSG § 2B3.l. The specific offense characteris
tic states: "if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or
to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 2.B3.l(b)(4)(B).
25. See USSG § 2B3.l(b)(4)(A).
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at issue specifically prohibits it.26 If the Guideline provision does not
specifically prohibit double counting, however, a defendant's success
ful appeal depends on the circuit where the appeal is heard. Some cir
cuits hold that double counting is only impermissible when the
Guideline provision at issue specifically prohibits it.27 Other circuits
hold that double counting is always impermissible, whether or not the
Guideline provision specifically prohibits it.28 Finally, some circuits
have not formulated a rule for the permissibility of double counting.29
Whether David, who committed aggravated assault with a chair (a
weapon this Note considers "inherently nondangerous"),30 receives the
same sentence as Dorothy, who committed aggravated assault with a
gun (a weapon this Note considers "inherently dangerous"), depends,
not on the different type of weapon used,31 but on the court's view of
26. See Smulow, supra note 11, at 455.
27. See United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[D]ouble count
ing a factor under different guidelines is permitted if the Commission intended that result.");
United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Double counting is prohibited only if
the particular guidelines at issue forbid it."); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir.
1993) ("[T]he Sentencing Guidelines are explicit when double counting is forbidden.");
United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]here is nothing wrong with 'dou
ble counting' when it is necessary to make the defendant's sentence reflect the full extent of
the wrongfulness of his conduct."); United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1992)
("As we recently noted, '[t]he Sentencing Commission plainly understands the concept of
double counting, and expressly forbids it where it is not intended.' " (quoting United States
v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1992))).
28. See United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Impermissible double
counting occurs when a district court imposes two or more upward adjustments within the
guidelines range, when both are premised on the same conduct.''); United States v. Flinn, 18
F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Impermissible double counting . . . occurs when the same
conduct on the part of the defendant is used to support separate increases under separate
enhancement provisions which necessarily overlap . . . and serve identical purposes.'');
United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164, 166-67 (6th Cir. 1992) (superceded by statute)
("[T]he Commission did not intend for the same conduct to be punished cumulatively under
separate Guidelines provisions.''); United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir.
1990) ("[T]he Sentencing Commission did not intend for multiple Guidelines sections to be
construed so as to impose cumulative punishment for the same conduct.").
29. Compare United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) (impermissible
double counting to use one factor to calculate both the base offense level and a specific of
fense characteristic), with United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
a district court does not engage in impermissible doublecounting when it considers a single
act that is relevant to two dimensions of the Guidelines analysis, but not clarifying whether
such consideration constitutes permissible double counting, or does not constitute double
counting at all). See United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1993) (Double counting
in the sentencing context "is a phenomenon that is less sinister than the name implies.'');
United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) ("the Commission's ready resort to ex
plicitly stated prohibitions against double counting signals that courts should go quite slowly
in implying further such prohibitions where none are written.'').
30. See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 506-07 (creating the distinction between "not an inherently
dangerous weapon" and an "inherently dangerous weapon"); see also United States v.
Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 189-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
31. While some courts recognize the distinction between inherently dangerous and non
inherently dangerous weapons, see supra note 30, the Guidelines do not distinguish between
the types of weapons in the definition of "dangerous weapon.'' The Guidelines define "dan-
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"double counting" under the Guideline's provision for aggravated as
sault.
The double counting that occurs under the aggravated assault pro
vision when an inherently nondangerous weapon was used, however, is
somewhat unique. The aggravated assault provision, by its language
and structure, appears to rule out double counting. When courts apply
facts involving inherently nondangerous weapons to the aggravated
assault provision, however, they inevitably face the opportunity to
double count.32 Although yet to be named by courts or commentators,
this Note refers to this phenomenon as "applied double counting."
Stated another way, a court engages in "applied double counting"
when it applies facts to a Guideline provision that does not appear on
its face to support double counting, yet the resulting sentence inevita
bly double counts aspects of the defendant's conduct.
The federal circuits are split on the permissibility of applied double
counting under the aggravated assault provision when a defendant
used an inherently nondangerous weapon to assault a victim.33 The
Second and Sixth Circuits conclude that such applied double counting
is impermissible double counting.34 Most other circuits, however, find
application of the second enhancement to be permissible double

gerous weapon" as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Where
an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed,
treat the object as a dangerous weapon." USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n. l(d). See United States v.
Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n the proper circumstances, almost anything
can count as a dangerous weapon, including walking sticks, leather straps, rakes, tennis
shoes, rubber boots, dogs, rings, concrete curbs, clothes irons, and stink bombs."(citations
omitted)). Further, the aggravated assault guideline applies to the use of any and all types of
dangerous weapons. See USSG § 2A2.2(a) and cmt. n.1. Arguably, it may be difficult for
some courts to distinguish between inherently dangerous weapons and inherently non
dangerous weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 919 (10th Cir. 1997).
Courts might define an inherently dangerous weapon to be a weapon designed to harm, for
example a bomb, a grenade, or a machine gun. Alternatively, courts might choose to con
sider any weapon that is generally used with premeditated intent to be inherently dangerous.
This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
32. Part I infra provides a detailed explanation of why double counting under these cir
cumstances is inevitable.
33. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit determined the sentence of a defendant, Mr. Morris, who
had driven a car at an officer of the law. See United States v. Morris, 131 F.3d 1136 (5th Cir.
1997). The court found that to apply the enhancement because Mr. Morris "otherwise used"
the car was not double counting. See id. at 1139. In Rhode Island, the First Circuit deter
mined the sentence of a defendant, Mr. Garcia, who also had driven a car at an officer of the
law. See United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994). The court there found that to ap
ply the enhancement because Mr. Garcia "otherwise used" the car was permissible double
counting. See id. at 11-12. In New York, the Second Circuit determined the sentence of a de
fendant, Mr. Hudson, who had also driven a car at an officer of the law. See Hudson, 972
F.2d at 507. The court there found that to apply the enhancement because Mr. Hudson "oth
erwise used" the car was impermissible double counting. See id.
34. See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; Farrow, 198 F.3d at 195.
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counting.35 The few remaining circuits do not consider application of
the second enhancement to be double counting at all.36
This Note uses the example of applied double counting under the
aggravated assault Guideline to urge courts to limit permissible double
counting to those circumstances where the Guidelines unequivocally
permit it. Part I compares the resulting sentences when the aggravated
assault provision is applied to the specific facts of a defendant who
committed aggravated assault with an inherently nondangerous
weapon and a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an
inherently dangerous weapon. Part I then argues that the statute's
structure and plain language show the Commission's intent to prohibit
the applied double counting, yet demonstrates that courts will inevita
bly face the opportunity to double count when sentencing a defendant
who used an inherently nondangerous weapon. Part II challenges
some courts' reliance on a canon of statutory construction, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,31 in their reasoning that the Commission in
tended applied double counting under the aggravated assault provi
sion. Part II argues that the invocation of this canon is inappropriate in
the context of applied double counting. Part III urges courts to refrain
from applied double counting to avoid violating the rule of lenity:
courts are to construe ambiguous statues in favor of the accused.38 Part
III further urges courts to resist applied double counting because it
violates the Commission's goal of proportionality in sentencing.39 This
Note concludes that courts should adopt a rule whereby all double
counting is impermissible unless the Guidelines expressly permit it.
This way, courts will avoid applied double counting that the Commis
sion did not anticipate or intend.
I.

T HE PROVISION'S STRUCTURE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE
C OMMISSION DID NOT INTEND TO PERMIT
APPLIED D OUBLE C OUNTING

Under the aggravated assault provision, applied double counting
inevitably occurs in cases where a defendant committed aggravated as35. See United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v.
Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sorensen, 58 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1996); Reese, 2 F.3d at 870; Duran,
127 F.3d at 916-19.
36. See Morris, 131 F.3d at 1138-40; United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200 (3rd Cir.
1997); Garcia, 34 F.3d at 11.
37. The canon holds that "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative." B LACK S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999).
'

38. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57,
58 (1998).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1998); USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3). For an analysis of
whether these goals are being met, see Karle & Sager, supra note 10.
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sault with an inherently nondangerous weapon such as a chair or a
tennis racket. It is apparent from the structure and language of the
statutory provision, however, that the Commission intended the oppo
site result: that courts count each aspect of the defendant's conduct
only once. Section I.A demonstrates that by designing the aggravated
assault Guideline in a structure known as a "graduated enhancement
schedule," the Commission intended to prohibit courts from double
counting. Section LB shows that applied double counting inevitably
results when courts apply the second specific offense characteristic
("when a dangerous weapon was otherwise used"), to the sentence of
a defendant who used an inherently nondangerous weapon when
committing aggravated assault. Section LB then argues that courts that
apply this second specific offense characteristic under these circum
stances contradict the Commission's intentions.
A.

The Commission Designed the Statute to A void Double Counting

This section argues that the Commission explicitly designed the ag
gravated assault Guideline so that when courts apply the provided
specific offense characteristics, they do not double count any of the de
fendant's actions. When a court applies specific offense characteristics
to increase the sentencing level of a defendant who committed aggra
vated assault with an inherently dangerous weapon such as a gun,40 be
cause of the statute's structure, that court cannot double count any
factor of the defendant's conduct or harm caused.
First, the Guidelines provide that a defendant qualifies for the base
offense level "aggravated assault" by "involving" a dangerous
weapon.41 The Guidelines define aggravated assault as "a felonious as
sault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with the intent to do bod
ily harm, (i.e., not merely to frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or
(C) an intent to commit another felony."42
Then, the Commission provides a means by which courts can en
hance the sentence of a defendant who committed aggravated assault
according to the egregiousness of the use of the weapon involved. The
enhancements, based on three special offense characteristics, are
structured as what one court has termed a "graduated enhancement

40. This Note uses a gun throughout as an example of a clear-cut "inherently danger
ous" weapon.
41. See USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. Commentators understand the base offense level to
mean "mere possession." See THOMAS w. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2A2.2 (2000 ed.). Recall that the Guidelines define a dangerous
weapon as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury." See supra
note 31. Recall also that both a chair and a gun fall into the category of "dangerous weapon."
42. USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. See supra note 3.
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schedule."43 The term is appropriate because the statute or "schedule"
is graduated: the special offense characteristics progress in gradation
order from least harmful to most harmful and the length of sentence
corresponds to each level's relative harm. That is, each gradation ac
counts for more egregious harm than the last and accordingly provides
for a longer sentence.
The following table illustrates the graduated enhancement sched
ule and the conduct for which the base offense level and each specific
offense characteristic accounts when a defendant committed an aggra
vated assault using a gun.
TABLEl
GRADUATED ENHANCEMENT
SCHEDULE FOR
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

CONDUCT WITH AN
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
WEAPON

base offense level: "involving a dangerous weapon"

assaulting while carrying a gun in a holster

first enhancement: "brandishing or
threatening with a dangerous
weapon"

assaulting while pointing, waving or
threatening with a gun

second enhancement: "a dangerous
weapon was otherwise used"

pistol whipping with the butt of a gun

third enhancement: "firing a firearm"

assaulting while firing a gun in the air

A defendant who committed aggravated assault involving a dan
gerous weapon qualifies for the base offense level by "merely pos
sessing"44 a dangerous weapon. Consequently, when a defendant, with
the intent to do bodily harm, assaults a victim while possessing an in
herently dangerous weapon (for example, carries a gun in a holster),
he commits an aggravated assault.45 A defendant incurs three addi
tional points under the first enhancement if he brandished or threat
ened to use the gun.46 Brandishing or threatening is different and more

43. United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 916 (10th Cir. 1997); see United States v.
Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507 ("incremental adjustment schedule"); Farrow, 198 F.3d at 190 ("in
cremental adjustment schedule").
44. Commentators and courts understand the nature of the base offense level, "involv
ing" a dangerous weapon, to mean "mere possession." See HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note
41, at§ 2A2.2.

45. USSG§ 2A2.2.
46. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(C).
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egregious than inere possession because the gun is waved about or its
use is threatened.4 7
Under the second enhancement a court adds four points when "a
dangerous weapon . . . was otherwise used."48 The Commission defines
such use as "conduct that did not amount to the discharge of a firearm
but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or
other dangerous weapon."49 Although the Guidelines do not provide
an example of conduct greater than brandishing but less than firing a
firearm, commentators suggest that an applicable example might be
striking a victim with the butt of a gun ("pistol whipping").50 If the de
fendant "otherwise used" a gun, he receives a harsher sentence than
he would for possession, brandishing, or threatening because other
wise using a gun is conduct different from and more egregious than
brandishing, threatening, and mere possession.
Finally, the Guidelines provide that the defendant incurs five
points if he discharged the gun.51 By providing the harshest penalty for
firing a gun, the Commission demonstrates its value judgment that dis
charging a firearm, even into the air, while committing an assault is
different from and more egregious than possessing, brandishing,
threatening, or pistol whipping. A defendant who does so is sentenced
accordingly.
Because of the graduated enhancement structure of the aggravated
assault provision, when a court applies that provision to a case involv
ing a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an inherently
dangerous weapon (such as a gun), the court cannot double count any
aspect of the defendant's conduct.52 When the schedule is utilized as
47. The Commission defines "brandished" with reference to a dangerous weapon (in
cluding a firearm) to mean "that the weapon was pointed or waved about, or displayed in a
threatening manner." USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n.l(c).
48. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).
49. USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n.l(g).
50. HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note 41, at § 2A2.2 cmt. 3a(ii) (citing USSG § lBl.1,
cmt. n.4(d)). Case law provides further examples of conduct that courts have concluded con
stitutes "otherwise used": United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238 (3d. Cir. 1991) (leveling a
gun at the head of a victim at close range and verbalizing a threat to discharge the weapon);
United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.Zd 985 (5th Cir. 1990) (both brandishing and threatening
with a dangerous weapon).
51. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A).
52. The graduated enhancement schedule clearly works neatly with a gun as the exam
ple of an inherently dangerous weapon. Other potentially inherently dangerous weapons
such as a switchblade would fit also into the graduated enhancement schedule. For example,
the base offense level could be carrying a hidden switchblade while assaulting a victim. The
first enhancement could be holding the switchblade and threatening to use it while assaulting
a victim. The third enhancement could be throwing the closed switchblade at the victim, or
knocking the victim on the head with the handle of the switchblade. Notably, because there
is no fourth enhancement for an inherently dangerous weapon such as a switchblade, "oth
erwise use" might be any "use" of the weapon in the assault that is more egregious than
brandishing or threatening. Such use might include cutting or slicing.
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intended by its structure, it determines a defendant's sentence for ag
gravated assault with a gun without double counting any conduct.
Each enhancement accounts for new and more egregious conduct; no
conduct overlaps; and each enhancement corresponds to a greater
punishment for a greater crime. The structurevof the sentencing provi
sion thus demonstrates the Commission's intent to avoid punishing de
fendants twice for the same conduct.
B.

The Commission did not Intend for Applied Double Counting
when Inherently Nondangerous Weapons were Used

The Commission designed the aggravated assault Guideline to in
clude a graduated enhancement schedule that corresponds to the use
of a weapon. When courts apply the second specific offense character
istic because a defendant "otherwise used a dangerous weapon" and
the weapon was inherently nondangerous, courts inevitably double
count the defendant's "use" of the weapon. The resulting double
counting is impermissible because the graduated nature of the en
hancement schedule falls apart. Section LB illustrates this inevitable
applied double counting and argues that the Commission did not in
tend for it to occur. Section l.B.1 demonstrates that when courts apply
the second enhancement in the case of an aggravated assault with an
inherently nondangerous weapon, the structure of the graduated en
hancement schedule falls apart. Each level of the graduated enhance
ment schedule no longer accounts for different and more egregious
conduct than the last. Instead, the base offense level and the second
enhancement double count the same conduct. Section l.B.2 examines
the statute's plain language and illustrates that the Commission de
fined the base offense level with the word "involving" a dangerous
weapon, and defined the second enhancement with the phrase "oth
erwise used" a dangerous weapon. The Commission used different
words to describe different conduct. This section argues that in the
context of an assault with an inherently nondangerous weapon the dif
ference between the conduct described by the words "inv.olve" and
"use" evaporates, resulting in the base offense level and a second en
hancement that double count for identical conduct. As illustrated
through the statute's structure and plain language, Section I.B.3 argues
that the Commission intended each invocation of the defendant's con
duct to serve a unique sentencing purpose, and thus did not intend to
permit applied double counting.
1.

Statutory Structure

Although the Commission designed the statute as a graduated en
hancement schedule, a court that sentences a defendant who commit
ted aggravated assault with a chair cannot enhance for "otherwise"

194

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:183

using the chair without double counting the "use" of the chair. When a
court applies the second enhancement, the graduated nature of the
enhancement schedule falls apart.
Although courts and commentators understand that the "mere
possession" of an inherently dangerous weapon constitutes sufficient
use of a weapon to qualify a defendant for the base offense level of
aggravated assault,53 the "mere possession" of an inherently nondan
gerous weapon such as a chair only constitutes simple assault.54 A de
fendant may possess a chair while intending to do bodily harm to
someone by sitting on the chair while punching someone with his fists.
Or a defendant may possess a hammer while assaulting with the intent
to do bodily harm, simply by wearing a tool belt while pulling some
one's hair.55 Unless the defendant uses, brandishes or threatens to use
the inherently nondangerous weapon beyond mere possession, the de
fendant does not qualify for the base offense level of aggravated as
sault.56 Instead, he commits the lesser offense of minor assault.57
Because it is the use or threatened use that transforms an inher
ently nondangerous object into a dangerous weapon, sentencing courts
necessarily count the use or threatened use of the object when they
apply the base offense level of aggravated assault. In detem1ining
when an inherently nondangerous object constitutes a dangerous
weapon, courts have held that it is not only the object's capability of
infliction of death or serious bodily injury, but also the instrument's

53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
54. See United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[M]ere possession of
a car during an assault will not convert an ordinary assault into an aggravated one."); United
States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 194 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Diana Graettinger, State Asks
Judge if Man Out on Bail can Use Explosives: Suspect in Standoff Works with Dynamite,

BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 1999 (noting that when a District Attorney in a case. stated
"[i]t is difficult for me to imagine a claim that dynamite and blasting caps . . . are not inher
ently dangerous," the defendant's attorney disagreed, noting that objects are only dangerous
weapons if they are intended to be used in a manner that could cause death or serious bodily
injury).
55. The Sixth Circuit in Farrow used the following example to illustrate this point: "If,
for example, Farrow had been standing next to his car and had charged at Agent Ward but
had done him little or no harm, we would not consider his offense an 'aggravated assault'
simply because he possessed an object (his car) that, under different circumstances, could
have been used as a dangerous weapon." 198 F.3d at 194.
56. Recall, however, that a defendant can qualify for aggravated assault by ways other
than those involving a dangerous weapon. See supra note 3. If the defendant committed the
felonious assault while attempting to commit another felony or by inflicting serious bodily
harm, then the defendant who merely possessed a chair or a hammer could qualify for the
base offense level of aggravated assault. This Note, however, as mentioned in the introduc
tion, only considered a fact pattern where a defendant qualifies for aggravated assault only
because he involved a dangerous weapon.
57. The Guidelines define "minor assault" as "a misdemeanor assault, or a felonious
assault not covered by§ 2A2.2." USSG § 2A2.3(a), cmt. n.1.
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use or threatened use combined with that capability that makes it dan
gerous.58
For example, in United States v. Hudson, the court stated "it is the
use or threatened use of the object which makes [an] assault aggra
vated."59 The court similarly noted that a "defendant can not be guilty
of assault with an non-inherently dangerous weapon . . . unless the
object is used (or its use is threatened) in a dangerous way."60 In
Hudson, the defendant "used" a car by driving the car toward a fed
eral marshal and thereby qualified for the aggravated assault Guide
line.61 Without having used the car in this manner, the defendant
would not have transformed the car into a dangerous weapon.62 Thus,
if an assailant drives slowly by a victim, reaches out of the window and
punches the victim with the intent to hurt him, he commits minor as
sault, but if he drives the car at the victim with the intent to hurt him
with the impact of the car, he commits aggravated assault by his use of
the car.63 Further, his use of the car is also threatening, and could be
characterized as brandishing.64
Because a defendant who commits aggravated assault with an in
herently nondangerous weapon qualifies for the base offense level of
aggravated assault due to his "use" or threatened use of the weapon, a
court double counts if it applies the specific offense characteristic "a
dangerous weapon was otherwise used" to the defendant's sentence.
Recall that double counting occurs because in applying the specific of
fense characteristic of "otherwise used," the court is not taking ac
count of any different or more egregious conduct than has already
been accounted for.65 If "use" is not accounted for in the base offense
level for aggravated assault, for example when a gun is involved, the
court does not double count when it applies the specific offense char-

58. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 106 F.3d 1092, 1095 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding
jury instruction stating that "[a]lmost any object which, as used, or attempted to be used,
may endanger life or inflict great bodily harm, can be a deadly or dangerous weapon");
United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) ("whether an object constitutes a
dangerous weapon hinges .. . (in part] on the manner in which the object is used"); United
States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1433 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that whether an object is
a dangerous weapon depends on the circumstances of the case, as "the manner in which the
object is used in the assault is determinative"); United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1166
(8th Cir. 1988) ("Almost any weapon, as used or attempted to be used, . . . may be a danger
ous and deadly weapon.").
59. 972 F.2d at 507.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See supra note 47.
65. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.·
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acteristic "otherwise used."66 The converse, however, is also true: if
"use" is accounted for in the base offense level, the court double
counts when it applies the specific offense characteristic of "otherwise
used."67
The demolition of the graduated nature of the sentencing schedule
is apparent.68 The following table compares conduct considered in the
graduated enhancement schedule when a defendant committed aggra
vated assault using an inherently dangerous weapon with the conduct
considered when a defendant committed aggravated assault using an
inherently nondangerous weapon.

66. See supra Section I.A (noting that a court does not double count any conduct when it
applies any of the three specific offense characteristics to the base offense level of a defen
dant who commits aggravated assault with a gun).
67. Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 812-13
(2d Cir. 1995), amending and superceding 49 F.3d 848 (2d Cir. 1995). But see United States v.
Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 896 n.32 (9th Cir. 1993) ("That we use a single sentencing factor 'twice' to
trace the effects of this transformation (first to distinguish minor from aggravated assaults,
then to distinguish more and Jess culpable aggravated assaults) is merely an accidental by
product of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines."). Whether or not using the factor
"twice" is "merely an accidental by-product of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines,"
this Note argues that such use constitutes impermissible double counting.
68. The Fifth Circuit sought to avoid double counting by asserting that an inherently
non-dangerous weapon can be "used" two different ways. See United States v. Morris, 131
F.3d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997). In Morris, "during the course of [the] criminal episode," the
defendant rammed his Blazer into an FBI agent's vehicle and fled from the law enforcement
authorities "recklessly and at a high rate of speed to escape capture." Id. The court found
that the "ramming" rendered the vehicle a dangerous weapon, and qualified the defendant
for the aggravated assault base offense level. Id. The court further found that the subsequent
"fleeing" constituted the "otherwise" use of the weapon. Id. While it might be possible to
use, and otherwise use an inherently non-dangerous weapon in two different ways, note that
"the mere fact that a bad act can be described in two different ways does not justify making
two separate upward adjustments" under the Guidelines. United States v. Campbell, 967
F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992). To avoid double counting the two uses must occur during the
course of the assault. The aggravated assault guideline does not apply to the conduct unless
the defendant used the dangerous weapon in the assault and the defendant intended to in
flict bodily harm or commit another felony or caused serious bodily harm. See United States
v. Hood, 210 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing USSG § 2A2.2 (2)).
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TABLE 2
GRADUATED
ENHANCEMENT
SCHEDULE

CONDUCT WITH AN
INHERENTLY
DANGEROUS
WEAPON

CONDUCT WITH AN
INHERENTLY
NONDANGEROUS
WEAPON

base offense level: "involving a dangerous
weapon"

assaulting while carrying
6
a gun in a holster 9

assaulting by driving a
car at a victim

first enhancement:
"brandishing or
threatening with a
dangerous weapon"

assaulting while pointing,
waving, or threatening
with a gun

assaulting by driving a
car at a victim

second enhancement:
"a dangerous weapon
was otherwise used"

pistol whipping with the
butt of a gun

assaulting by driving a
car at a victim

third enhancement:
"firing a firearm"

assaulting while firing a
firearm

no application

As discussed above in Section I.A, the Commission intended each
enhancement of the graduated enhancement schedule to account for
new and more egregious conduct. 7° Consequently, the Commission
could not have intended the double counting that results when courts
apply the second enhancement because "a dangerous weapon was
otherwise used" 71 in situations where they have already accounted for
the "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon in the base offense
level. Instead, the structure of the graduated enhancement schedule
demonstrates that the Commission intended the enhancements to ac
count for new and more egregious conduct.
2.

Plain Language

The Commission defined the base offense level for aggravated as
sault as "involving a dangerous weapon" and the specific offense char
acteristic as "a dangerous weapon . . . was otherwise used." 72 Through
its use of different wording, the Commission demonstrated that the
base offense level and the second enhancement account for different

69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing "mere.possession").
70. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
71. USSG§ 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).
72. See supra note 2.
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conduct.73 In the context of aggravated assault with an inherently
nondangerous weapon, however, the distinction carries no meaning.74
The difference does hold meaning when "involving" means "mere pos
session," as in the case of aggravated assault with an inherently dan
gerous weapon such as a gun,75 but in the case of an aggravated assault
with an inherently nondangerous weapon, "involving" means "used"76
and therefore "otherwise used" carries no additional meaning.
3.

Commission's Intent

The fact that application of the second enhancement to the sen
tence of a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an inher
ently nondangerous weapon inevitably results in applied double
counting does not end the inquiry because, as noted in the introduc
tion, double counting is not always impermissible.77 This section argues
that the inevitable applied double counting discussed in this Note is
impermissible because the Commission did not intend for courts to
engage in applied double counting. As already examined, the
Commission demonstrated its intent that the enhancement schedule
be gradual,78 thus, the Commission did not intend for the graduated
nature of the schedule to fall apart. Also, the Commission used plain
language to demonstrate its intent that the words "involve" and "oth
erwise use" carry different meanings.79 Thus, the Commission did not
intend a result where the difference between the words evaporates.
More specifically, this section argues that applied double counting
is impermissible because each invocation of a particular behavior fails
to serve a unique sentencing purpose. Recall that a court double
counts a defendant's "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon be
cause each enhancement for the behavior accounts for the same con
duct.80 The defendant's "use" of the weapon refers to one action 73. See Gershon M. Ratner, The Federal Circuit's Approach to Statutory and Regulatory
Construction, With Emphasis on Veteran's Law, 6 FED. CIR. B. J. 243, 249 (1996) ("Statutory
language must be construed so as to give separate meaning to each word, so that no words
are treated as mere surplusage, entirely without meaning.") (internal quotations omitted);
see also R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 52 (1997)
(noting that the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis provides that "words are to
be read in context with neighboring words in the same document").
74. See generally United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1992). But see
United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 206-207 (4th Cir. 1992).
75. See supra Section I.A.
76. See supra Section LB.
77. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
78. See supra Section l.B.l.
79. See supra Section l.B.2.
80. See supra Section l.B.l.
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one harm committed by the defendant.81 This section examines the
meaning of "unique sentencing purpose" and argues that when each
invocation of a particular behavior does not serve a unique purpose,
the Commission did not intend the resulting double counting.82
Consider a situation in the Guidelines where double counting is
permissible because the two Guidelines applied to a single action refer
to different conceptual harms. Under th e robbery provision section
2B3.1, the base offense level can be enhanced for the specific offense
characteristic of physical restraint.83 If the robber necessarily re
strained the victim in order to accomplish the robbery, a coµrt that en
hances the sentence for the restraint has double counted conduct nec
essary for the robbery to take place. In this case, however, the double
counting is permissible because the robbery (the actual taking of
property), and the physical restraint (the conduct necessary to commit
the taking of the property), constitute different and distinct harms.
Because "robbery does not necessarily entail physical restraint,"84 it is
possible to distinguish the physical restraint as a separate harm from
the robbery.
Courts must determine whether conduct used to establish the base
offense level serves a sentencing purpose unique from the way the
same conduct is used to establish another part of the Guideline, here,
"otherwise using" a weapon. The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in
United States v. Reese.85 In Reese, the defendant housing authority po
lice officer struck the victim on the head with a flashlight, an inher
ently nondangerous weapon. In doing so, the defendant seriously in
jured the victim. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that
the district court double counted the use of the flashlight when it ap
plied the enhancement for "otherwise using" the flashlight. In his
analysis of the double counting issue presented in Reese, Judge
O'Scannlain determined that it is impermissible double counting to
"use a single aspect of conduct both to determine [the base offense
81. See United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 813 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992).
82. See United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("(M]ultiple uses of a par
ticular aspect of a defendant's past behavior are proper where each invocation of the par
ticular behavior serves a unique purpose under the Guidelines.") (quoting United States v.
Starr, 971 F.2d 357, 361 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159,
1161 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that double counting is permissible if "each section concerns
conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing") (quoting United States v. Aimufa, 935
F.2d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that double counting is permissible "where a single act is relevant to two dimensions
of the Guideline analysis").
83. See supra note 20.
84. Reese, 2 F.3d at 895 (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir.
1992)) (cataloging examples of cases where double counting was permissible because two
different harms were accounted for in the sentencing).
85. Id.
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level] and to increase the base offense level mandated thereby . . .
[where] absent such conduct, it is impossible to come within that
guideline. "86
Thus, at least in the Ninth Circuit, if a court uses the same conduct
both to qualify the defendant for a base offense level and to increase
that base level with a specific offense characteristic, the court imper
missibly double counts unless the defendant could have qualified for
the base offense level due to any other unique conduct. In Reese, the
defendant housing authority police officer both "otherwise used" a
flashlight to strike a suspect on the head, and "inflict[ed] serious bod
ily injury"87 on the victim. As a result, the Ninth Circuit court noted
that since the defendant could have come under the Guideline by con
duct other than his "use" of the flashlight, the double counting was
permissible.88 The result in Reese makes sense: the defendant there en
gaged in at least two of the types of conduct for which one may qualify
for the aggravated assault Guideline, so enhancing a sentence when
the flashlight was "otherwise used" was not impermissible double
counting. Accordingly, this Note urges courts to find double counting
impermissible if a sentencing court uses a single aspect of conduct (the
use of the dangerous weapon) both to determine the applicable base
offense level (aggravated assault) and to apply an enhancement (oth
erwise using a dangerous weapon) where, absent the use of the dan
gerous weapon, it was impossible for the defendant to come within the
base offense level Guideline.89
When the facts of an aggravated assault involving the use of an in
herently nondangerous weapon are applied to the Ninth Circuit's test,
the result is as follows: It would be permissible double counting for a
defendant who seriously injured a victim with a chair to be sentenced
for otherwise using the chair because he qualified for aggravated as
sault as a result of the inflicted injury. Similarly, it would be permissi
ble double counting for a defendant who committed the aggravated
assault with the chair in the midst of an attempted bank robbery to be
sentenced for otherwise using the chair because he qualified for aggra
vated assault as a result of his attempt to commit another felony. In
the factual scenario addressed in this Note, however, the defendant
neither inflicts serious bodily harm on the victim nor attempts to

86. Id.
87. Recall that there are three ways to come within the aggravated assault guideline ac
cording to the definition of aggravated assault. "Aggravated assault" is "a felonious assault
that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to
frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony." USSG §
2A2.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added).
88. Reese, 2 F.3d at 895.
89. See id.
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commit another felony.90 As a result, according to the Ninth Circuit's
test, it is impossible for the defendant to qualify for the base offense
level other than for the "use" of the chair. The Commission could not
have intended courts to double count where each invocation of "use"
does not serve a unique purpose.91
II.

C OURTS S HOULD NOT USE THE CANON EXPRESSIO UN/US EST

EXCL USIO ALTERIUS92 TO PERMIT APPLIED D OUBLE C OUNTING

This section challenges some courts' conclusions that the Commis
sion intended applied double counting because it expressly prohibited
double counting elsewhere in the Guidelines, but did not forbid it un
der the aggravated assault Guideline. These courts rely on the canon
of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (hereinaf
ter "expressio unius" ) . This section argues that reliance on this canon
is inappropriate in the context of applied double counting.
90. See supra text accompanying note 3.
91. Unfortunately, subsequent courts have applied the test articulated in Reese, 2 F.3d
870, in a manner that does not appear to make sense. In Reese the defendant did in fact have
the intent to commit another felony and used a non-inherently dangerous weapon to commit
an aggravated assault. Id. at 895-96. In that case it was appropriate for the defendant to have
points applied to his sentence for each harmful act. The court in Duran, however, interpreted
the reasoning in Reese to mean that, unless there is no other way for any hypothetical defen
dant to qualify for the aggravated assault guideline other than his use of a dangerous
weapon, only then can there be impermissible double counting of the "use" conduct. United
States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 917 (10th Cir. 1997).
According to these courts' interpretation of the Ninth Circuit's language, unless it is im
possible to qualify for aggravated assault in any way other than involving a dangerous
weapon, there can be no impermissible double counting of the "use of the dangerous
weapon." See, e.g., Duran, 127 F.3d at 917; United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617, 619 (8th
Cir. 1996).
In application, this means that because there are two additional ways a defendant might
qualify for the aggravated assault guideline, because the defendant committed another fel
ony or inflicted bodily injury, see supra note 82; see also United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d
179, 193 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit rule that "a guideline raises no
double counting concerns so Jong as it is capable of being applied in some hypothetical case
without counting the same conduct twice"), a court always will permissibly double count the
"use" of an inherently non-dangerous weapon.
The error of this extrapolation is plain. A defendant who qualified for the base offense
level by committing a felonious assault with the intent to commit another felony and also
used an inherently non-dangerous weapon would receive 19 points (15 for the base offense
level and 4 for the enhancement because a dangerous weapon was "otherwise used"). See
USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). At the same time, a defendant who qualified for the base offense
level by using a dangerous weapon but could theoretically have qualified for the base level
by having the intent to commit another felony (even though he did not have the intent)
would also receive 19 points (15 for committing aggravated assault involving a dangerous
weapon and 4 because he otherwise used a dangerous weapon). See id. ; see also Duran, 127
F.3d at 917. One defendant has committed two serious offenses, the other has committed
only one. The Ninth Circuit's language as erroneously used by other courts, creates, rather
than alleviates, disproportionality in sentencing. See infra Section III.B (discussing the
Commission's goal of proportionality in sentencing).
92. See supra note 37 (defining the canon: "to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative").
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Throughout the Guidelines, the Commission recognized certain in
stances where double counting could occur and expressly prohibited
the double counting. Section II.A asserts that these express prohibi
tions are overt whereas applied double counting is, by definition, a
phenomenon that is not plain on the face of the statute because it only
occurs through application.93 Thus, courts that rely on the canon make
an unrealistic assumption that the Commission recognized every po
tential instance of double counting in the Guidelines. Section 11.B
points out that the Guidelines both expressly permit and prohibit dou
ble counting, and thus argues that the canon, in this context, is mean
ingless.
A. Expressio Unius is Inappropriate when Double
Counting is As Applied

Throughout the Guidelines, the Commission prohibited certain in
stances of potential double counting.94 Using the canon of expressio
unius, some courts have argued that by including provisions that ex
pressly forbid double counting, the Commission demonstrated that it
understood the potential for double counting.95 This section argues
that this reliance on expressio unius is inappropriate because applied
double counting is distinguishable from the instances of double
counting that the Guidelines expressly prohibit. As Section I.A dem
onstrated, the double counting involved in an enhancement for other
wise using, brandishing, or threatening with a dangerous weapon is not
apparent from the face of the statute. In contrast, as this section will
show, the instances of double counting that the Commission explicitly
bars are overt and easily recognizable. Therefore, the omission of an
express prohibition of double counting more readily signifies an over
sight on the part of the Commission, rather than the intent to permit
applied double counting.

93. See Introduction (defining "applied double counting").
94. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 720 (cataloging instances of explicitly prohibited
double counting). For example, it is impermissible for courts to apply the adjustment en
hancement for a vulnerable victim if the definition of the offense or the specific offence
characteristic includes that vulnerability. USSG § 3Al.1 cmt. 2; USSG § 2A3.l(b)(2); see also
United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 672 (1st Cir. 1992) (cataloging instances of express
prohibition of double counting).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 212 (3d. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he princi
ple of statutory construction, expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius applies. Following these
principles, we conclude that the exclusion of a double counting provision in the [certain] sec
tions . . . was by design. Accordingly, an adjustment that clearly applies to the conduct of an
offense must be imposed unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability.") (second emphasis
added) (quoting Wong, 3 F.3d at 670-71). For cases relying on the concept of the canon, but
not the canon itself, see United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 205, 208 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Curtis 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 243 (5th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Goolsby, 908 F.2d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 1990).
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An example of overt double counting that is easily recognizable
because it could result from every factual application occurs in section
2X3.1 of the Guidelines.96 That provision sets the base offense level for
an offender who participates only as an accessory to a crime after the
fact.97 The base offense level for an accessory to a crime is set lower
than the base offense level for a principal offender.98 The application
notes99 to that provision provide that "an adjustment for reduced cul
pability is incorporated in the base offense level. "100 The Commission
thereby made it clear that courts are prohibited from double counting
the factor of reduced culpability of an accessory. Without this express
provision, courts might count reduced culpability twice: once, as it is
incorporated into the relatively low base offense level, and a second
time to further reduce the sentence because factors involving reduced
culpability in other crimes can mitigate the sentence.101 This instance of
potential double counting is overt. Most likely, the Commission easily
recognized it because every defendant who is an accessory rather than
a principal participant in a crime will have reduced culpability.102
Another overt example of expressly prohibited double counting
that raises the offense level occurs in section 2Cl.1 of the
Guidelines,103 where the Commission sets the base level for extortion
under color of official right. The application notes to the section in
struct the sentencing court not to apply the adjustment under section
3Bl.3 for abuse of a position of trust.104 Presumably courts are so in
structed because the base level for extortion under color of official
right necessarily contemplates such an abuse.105 Again, this instance of
potential double counting is obvious because extortion under color of
official right will necessarily be committed by official persons in posi
tions of trust. Consequently, such a crime will almost always be a di
rect result of an abuse of a position of trust.
96. USSG§ 2X3.1.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The Application Notes are designed to assist courts in interpreting Guideline provi
sions. See USSG § lBl.7. Courts are required, however, to follow application notes. See
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ("commentary is a binding interpretation");
United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 372 (3rd Cir. 1997).
100. USSG§ 2X3.1, cmt. n.2.
101. For example, under the aggravated assault guideline, a sentence is mitigated for the
assailant's reduced culpability if the assailant did not inflict serious bodily injury.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. USSG § 2Cl.1.
1 04. USSG § 2Cl.1 cmt. n.3.
1 05. See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing USSG §§
2Cl.1, cmt. n.3, 3Al.1 cmt. n.2, 3Al.2 cmt. n.3, 3Al.3 cmt. n.2, all expressly forbidding the
sentencing court from applying the adjustment if the offense provision specifically incorpo
rates that factor); see also Swearingen, supra note 22, at 719-20.
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In such instances where the Commission expressly prohibited dou
ble counting, a court would likely read the plain language of the stat
ute to require double counting even without an express prohibition.
Unlike instances of applied double counting, these instances do not
require the application of a number of different fact scenarios to ex
pose the potential for double counting. In contrast, the case of a de
fendant who commits aggravated assault with an inherently nondan
gerous weapon who neither inflicts serious bodily injury nor intends to
commit another felony is not an obvious fact pattern. Nor, when one
views the aggravated assault Guideline and its graduated enhancement
schedule, does one immediately become cognizant of the potential for
double counting that the Guideline presents. Courts that rely on ex
pressio unius argue that the Commission recognized this potential for
double counting, and determined that it was permissible.106 Because it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to contem
plate every fact pattern with every type of weapon to determine
whether certain facts applied to the Guidelines would result in double
counting, it seems unrealistic to presume that if the Commission did
not include an express prohibition of applied double counting, it in
tended the applied double counting.107
Contrary to the above examples of expressly forbidden double
counting, the plain language and natural application of the aggravated
assault Guideline do not display an overt instance of the potential for
double counting, even though in application the statute does in fact
lead to this result.108 In fact, as noted in Section l .A, a fact pattern that
comes to mind when reading the plain language of the aggravated as
sault Guideline is the case of aggravated assault with a dangerous
weapon such as a gun, particularly because the graduated enhance
ment schedule culminates with the firing of a firearm.109 It is realistic to
assume that the Commission overlooked the potential double counting
that could result in the case of an aggravated assault with an inherently
nondangerous weapon without serious bodily injury or intent to com
mit another felony. To have detected the potential for applied double
counting, the Commission would have had to imagine assaults with a
variety of dangerous and inherently nondangerous weapons.U0 The
Commission would also have had to imagine fact scenarios under the
106. See supra note 95.
107. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 733 ("Courts have recognized that they should
use the canon with care because it is an uncertain guide to legislative intent and is often
based on an unfounded assumption that the legislature considered and rejected all factors.")
(citing McKenna v. Ortho Pharm., 622 F.2d 657, 667 (3d Cir. 1980); Tri-State Terminals, Inc.,
v. Jesse, 596 E2d 752, 755 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979)).
108. See supra Section I.A; see also tbl.2.
109. See USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A); see also tbl.l.
1 10. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 731-33.
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Guideline involving each weapon in a variety of situations, including
where the defendant does not inflict serious bodily harm and does not
attempt to commit another felony. Given the relative complexity of
the facts addressed in this Note, and the seemingly straightforward na
ture of the aggravated assault Guidelines' graduated enhancement
schedule, it is unlikely that the Commission contemplated the possi
bility of applied double counting.
Courts relying on expressio unius in the context of applied double
counting overlook the fact that it is unlikely that the Commission was
aware of the possibility for applied double counting under the aggra
vated assault Guideline pursuant to a particular fact pattern. Instead,
this Note urges courts to adhere to the Supreme Court's rationale in
Standefer v. United States, a case deciphering congressional intent from
committee reports: The Commission should not be held responsible
for an unintended result pursuant to expressio unius, because the
Commission, like Congress in Standefer, should not have been ex
pected to "identify all of the 'weeds' which are being excised from the
garden. "1 1 1
B.

Expressio Unius is Meaningless Because i t Cuts Both Ways

The second reason that expressio unius cannot be applied to argue
that provisions lacking express prohibitions on double counting should
be construed to permit double counting is that the canon cuts both
ways. The Guidelines include both express provisions prohibiting dou
ble counting1 1 2 and express provisions permitting double counting.113
For example, in the provision for an illegal alien found in the country
after deportation,114 the Commission states "[a]n adjustment . . . for a
prior felony conviction applies in addition to any criminal history
points added for [the . identical) conviction in [the Criminal History
Chapter)."1 15 When a defendant argues that a court double counted a
111. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980) ("It is not necessary for
Congress in its committee reports to identify all of the 'weeds' which are being excised from
the garden.").
112. See, e.g. , USSG § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2 ("Where a sentence under this section is imposed
in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense characteristic
for the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm. (e.g., §§ 2B3.l(b)(2)(A)-(F)
(Robbery)) is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense.")).
113. See, e.g., USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A), cmt. n.4; see also USSG § lBl.1 cmt. n.4 ("Ab
sent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments from the different guideline sections are
to be applied cumulatively (added together). For example, the adjustments from
§ 2Fl.l(b)(2) (more than minimal planning) and § 3Bl.1 (Aggravating Role) are applied
cumulatively."); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that
Congress intended to impose multiple punishments for the same conduct under 18 U.S.C. §
2119, which outlaws car jacking, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which prohibits the use of a firearm
in a crime of violence).
114. This conduct is illegal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
115. USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A) cmt. n.4 (emphasis added).
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prior felony conviction under this provision, courts uphold the convic
tion, concluding that the Guidelines expressly permit the double
counting.116
Because some provisions of the Guidelines prohibit double count
ing and some provisions permit it, the canon can be used by propo
nents of either side of the argument. Courts can contend that because
the Commission expressly prohibited double counting in certain provi
sions, silent provisions demonstrate the Commission's intent to permit
double counting for those provisions. Courts can also contend that be
cause the Commission included at least one express provision permit
ting double counting, the Commission intended silent provisions to
prohibit double counting. As a result of this ambivalence, the canon in
this context is meaningless.
III . E VEN IF PERMISSIBLE, C OURTS SHOULD D ECLINE TO

CONDUCT

APPLIED D OUBLE COUNTING BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO
LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The Commission designed the Guidelines to promote uniformity, 11 7
fairness,118 and proportionality119 in sentencing. This section argues that
double counting the "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon con
tradicts these goals, and courts should therefore refrain from enhanc
ing the sentence of a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently
nondangerous weapon.
As discussed in Section l.B, when a court enhances the sentence of
a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently nondangerous
weapon, the graduated nature of the Guideline's enhancement sched
ule falls apart. When courts encounter a situation where a sentencing
provision's structure falls apart, the likely result is confusion among
the courts and lack of uniformity in sentencing nationwide.12° Section
116. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 698 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997)
("The plain language of the [note accompanying the guideline provision) suggests that such
double counting is permissible."); United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1159 (11th Cir.
1992); United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Swearingen, supra
note 22, at 720.
117. "Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide dis
parity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offense committed by similar offenders."
USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir.
1990) ("Uniformity in sentencing was undeniably a primary goal of Congress and the
Sentencing Commission.").
118. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3) ("The [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984)'s basic objective
was to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effec
tive, fair sentencing system.").
119. "[C)ongress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity." USSG ch. 1, pt.
A(3).
120. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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III.A asserts that the confusion created when courts face facts result
ing in applied double counting is sufficient grounds to sentence with
lenity, and that if all courts sentenced with lenity, uniformity would be
achieved.121 Section 111.B contends that because Congress deems
crimes with inherently dangerous weapons, (e.g., guns), more danger
ous than crimes with inherently nondangerous weapons, (e.g., chairs),
to apply the same sentence for both crimes is contrary to the
Commission's goals of fairness and proportionality in sentencing.
A.

Courts Should Apply the Rule of Lenity

The rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute[s] . . .
be construed in favor of the accused."122 Criminal statutes are tradi
tionally construed according to the rule of lenity, a name given to a
common law principle that "penal statutes should be strictly construed
against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penal
ties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be
imposed."123 The purpose of the rule of lenity is to provide adequate
notice to defendants and to reinforce the notion that only the legisla
ture has the power to define what conduct is criminal and what con
duct is not.124 This section argues that the rule of lenity is appropriate
in the context of applied double counting for two reasons. Section
111.A.1 argues that applied double counting is an appropriate context
for lenity because, by its nature, applied double counting involves
statutory ambiguity. Section 111.A.2 asserts that if courts apply the rule
of lenity and refrain from double counting when facts, as applied to a
statute, might lead to double counting, the goals of the rule would be
satisfied: sentencing with fair-warning and allowing Congress, not
courts, to determine when defendants should receive cumulative sen
tences.

121. It is true that uniformity would be achieved by the uniform application of the
higher of two possible sentences, (e.g., if all courts engaged in applied double counting).
Such a result, however, is inconsistent with the rule of lenity which instructs courts to apply
the more lenient of two possible sentences when the sentencing statute is ambiguous. The
rule of lenity is discussed in detail below.
·

122. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n.17 (1994).
123. Solan, supra note 38, at 58 (quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed. 1992)). Black's Law Dictionary defines "rule
of lenity" as: "The judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishment, should resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the more lenient punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332-33 (7th ed. 1999).
124. See Solan, supra note 38, at 58 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi
ties for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995) (mentioning the rationales)).
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Applied Double Counting Results in Statutory Ambiguity

When faced with the ambiguity of double counting as applied when
a defendant "otherwise used" an inherently nondangerous weapon to
commit aggravated assault, courts should apply the rule of lenity. The
rule of lenity applies if a Guideline is ambiguous as to the appropriate
sentence, and courts give the defendant the benefit of the lower sen
tence. 1 25 In the context of applied double counting discussed in this
Note, courts would apply only the base offense and refrain from en
hancing under the second specific offense characteristic.
While courts are not to invoke the rule of lenity haphazardly,126
lenity is appropriate in cases of applied double counting because the
structure and plain language of the applicable statutes lead to grievous
ambiguity. 127 On its face, the structure and language of the aggravated
assault Guideline establishes a clear graduated enhancement sched
ule. 128 When applied to the situation of a defendant who used an in
herently nondangerous weapon to commit aggravated assault, how
ever, the structure of the Guideline disintegrates129 and the language of
the Guideline seems to call for double counting.130 If applying a
Guideline to a fact pattern gamers a result different from the outcome
plainly called for on the face of the statute, the Guideline is ambiguous
because it will likely be understood in different ways.131

125. See United States v. Luna-Diaz, 222 F.3d 1, 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that where
a Guideline provision is ambiguous, the rule of lenity should be invoked to resolve the ambi
guity in favor of the criminal defendant); see also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177
(1958); United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting the rule of lenity
for interpretation of Guidelines).
126. The rule of lenity is not applicable unless "there is a grievous ambiguity or uncer
tainty in the language and structure of the Act." United States v. Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 140
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). It is a rule of last resort. See Wilson, 10
F.3d at 736. Thus, the mere assertion of an alternative interpretation is not sufficient to bring
the rule into play. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
127. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 1999) ("A rule against dou
ble counting is also consistent with the general rule of lenity in criminal cases."). This Note
argues that there is uncertainty in the meaning of the language "otherwise used" in the con
text of an inherently non-dangerous weapon. This Note also argues that there is grievous
ambiguity in the structure of the statute as applied to the facts, thus, use of the rule of lenity
is appropriate.
128. See USSG§ 2A2.2(b) and supra Section I.A, tbl.l.
129. See supra Section I.B.1, tbl.2.
130. See supra Section I.B; see also United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 894 (9th Cir.
1993) ("[O]n its face this Guidelines section clearly requires the 'double counting' of which
appellants complain here.").
131. Black's Law Dictionary defines "ambiguity" as "[a]n uncertainty of meaning or in
tention, as in a contractual term or statutory provision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th
ed. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary also quotes RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 76-77 (1976) as follows:
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In the Context of Applied Double Counting, Application of Lenity
Satisfies the R ule's Goals

The goals of the rule of lenity are satisfied if courts apply the rule
in the context of applied double counting: providing fair-warning in
sentencing and allowing legislators, not courts, to determine when de
fendants should receive cumulative sentences.132 The first goal, fair
warning in sentencing, would be satisfied by the application of the rule
of lenity to this case. 133 As it stands now, a person in David's position
may not know that he is subject to sentencing for aggravated assault
with a three level enhancement because he "otherwise used" a chair in
a bar fight, while a person like Dorothy, who pistol whipped with a
gun, might have a good idea that serious punishment will ensue. Fair
ness exists when the community knows "what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed."134 Without the rule of lenity, David has no idea,
when he is in the bar with the chair raised, that the consequences of his
actions could be to receive a sentence as harsh as the sentence re
ceived by one who pistol whips a victim with a gun. If courts apply the
rule of lenity here, the resulting sentence will appropriately corre
spond to David's understanding of the punishment he deserves for the
crime he committed.
The second goal of the rule of lenity would also be satisfied were
courts to apply the rule when faced with the opportunity to double

In the context of statutory interpretation the word most frequently used to indicate the
doubt which a judge must entertain before he can search for and, if possible, apply a secon
dary meaning is "ambiguity". In ordinary language this term is often confined to situations in
which the same word is capable of meaning two different things, but, in relation to statutory
interpretation, judicial usage sanctions the application of the word "ambiguity" to describe
any kind of doubtful meaning of words, phrases or !onger statutory provisions. Hinchy's case
prompted the suggestion that if, in a particular context, words convey to different judges a
different range of meanings "derived from, not fanciful speculations or mistakes about lin
guistic usage, but from true knowledge about the use of words, they are ambiguous.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 1999).
132. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971):
This principle [of lenity] is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition.
First, 'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning
fair, so fair as possible the line should be clear.' Second, because of the seriousness of crimi
nal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation
of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.

Id. at 348 (citations omitted); see also David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Envi
ronmental Enforcers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 931 (1996); Swearingen, supra note 22, at

728.
133. See United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990) ("This policy of
lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the
penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended." (citing Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169,
179 (1958)).
134. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
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count. The rule of lenity is based in part on the notion that courts pre
sume that legislators do not intend to impose multiple punishments for
one offense unless the legislators clearly express an intent to do so.135
This presumption comes from the fact that society does not want peo
ple to be punished unless lawmakers have clearly delineated the law.136
Lenity allows the legislature, not the courts, to determine when sen
tences should be applied cumulatively.13 7
In the case of a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently
nondangerous weapon, legislative intent for cumulative sentencing is
unknown. Perhaps the Commission intended to prohibit double
counting, given that the structure of the aggravated assault provision
implies graduated enhancement without double counting. Or maybe
the Commission intended the double counting that inevitably results
when certain facts are applied to the statute. When legislative intent
clearly appears to lead to two different results, lenity is appropriate.138
Courts should assume that the Commission intended not to impose
cumulative sentences like double counting, and thus give defendants
the lower sentence. If the legislators object, they can clarify the law to
call specifically for applied double counting.
B.

Proportionality in Sentencing Demands that Courts
Refrain from Double Counting as Applied:
Gun Crimes are Worse than Chair Crimes

Courts that engage in applied double counting to sentence chair
wielding attackers identically to gun-wielding attackers for less serious
conduct frustrate the Commission's goal of proportionality in sen
tencing.139 This section argues that a more lenient sentence for chair135. See Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1017 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689
(1980); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955)).
136. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (noting that the policy of allowing Congress, not the
courts, to determine criminal sentences, and forcing Congress to write laws clearly, embodies
"the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly
said they should") (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 209 (1967)).
137. See Romano, 910 F.2d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[I]mposing a rule against double
counting is consistent with Supreme Court decisions that have required a clear expression of
legislative intent to apply sentence enhancement provisions cumulatively." (citing Busic v.
United States, 446 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1978))).
138. See Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1017 ("Congress does not intend to impose multiple
punishments for one offense unless it clearly expresses an intent to do so.") (citing, inter alia,
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689; Bell, 349 U.S. at 84); see also Romano, 910 F.2d at 167.
139. Double counting "frustrate[s] the structure of the Guidelines and their goal of en
suring the proportionality of federal sentences." United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200,
213 (3rd Cir. 1997). See United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("When more
than one kind of harm is attributable to a given aspect of a defendant's conduct, failure to
enhance his punishment for each harm caused thereby would defeat the Commission's goal
of proportionality of sentencing.").
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wielding attackers is appropriate because a contrary result is dispro
portionate to the crime, and thus contrary to legislative intent.
The Commission developed the Guidelines in part to promote
proportionality in sentencing,140 so that the punishment imposed would
fit the crime committed.141 The Commission sought to address propor
tionality because of the variable nature of sentencing prior to the crea
tion of the Guidelines. Criminals convicted of lesser crimes were sub
ject to the real possibility that they might receive a longer sentence
than would a criminal convicted of a more egregious crime.142 The
Commission, in drafting the Guidelines, intended to end this injustice
by creating a system where the length or type of punishment corre
sponded to the seriousness of the crime committed.143 Further, the
Commission hoped to heighten the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system in the eyes of the public by curtailing prison sentences that ap
peared vastly disproportionate to the offense committed.144 Thus, the
Guidelines seek to punish a defendant for "all harm that resulted from
the acts and omissions" for which he is responsible.145
Applied double counting frustrates the legislative goal of propor
tionality in sentencing, and thus courts should avoid it.146 Each defen
dant who commits a felonious assault involving a dangerous weapon, a
gun or a chair, with the intent to commit bodily harm, should receive
15 points for aggravated assault.147 If, however, a court double counts
the "use" of a chair (once to qualify for the base offense level "in
volve" and again for the second enhancement "otherwise using"), and
only single counts the "use" of the gun (counts "possession" of the
gun, and then counts pistol whipping),148 but gives both defendants the
same enhancement for "otherwise using" the weapon, the resulting
sentences are disproportionate. The defendant who "used" the chair
to qualify for the base offense level (but did nothing else with it) and
the defendant who possessed the gun to qualify (and pistol whipped
his victim) would both receive 19 points.149
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1988); USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also supra note 139;
United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 918 (10th Cir. 1997).
141. Swearingen, supra note 22, at 715.
142. Karle & Sager, supra note 10, at 395-96.
143. See, e.g. , id. ; Andersen, supra note 12, at 185.
144. Karle & Sager, supra note 10, at 396 (noting the view that "sentencing was more a
product of a lottery than a rational punishment scheme undermined public confidence in,
and respect for, the criminal justice system").
145. USSG§ 1Bl.3(a)(3).
146. See, e.g. , United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1999).
147. The court should apply the base offense level for aggravated assault. See USSG §
2A2.2.
148. See supra Section l.B.1 tbl.2.
149. See id.
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The Guidelines provide a graduated enhancement schedule that
makes sense when there is an aggravated assault with a gun.15° Courts
therefore know what sentence to give to a defendant who committed
aggravated assault with a gun. If a court grants the identical sentence
to a defendant who attacks with a chair or a car, the result is dispro
portionate sentencing. This is even clearer where an attacker who
throws a chair or drives a car at a victim receives the same sentence as
an attacker who pistol whips a victim.151
Sentencing criminals more leniently for attacking with chairs rather
than guns satisfies the Commission's goal of proportionality in sen
tencing. This section argues that because legislators generally treat gun
crimes more harshly in other contexts, treating gun crimes more
harshly in the applied double counting context would be proportion
ate, and in accord with the legislative intent.
Legislators generally treat crimes with inherently dangerous weap
ons, such as guns,152 more harshly than crimes with other, inherently
nondangerous objects. The Commission views crimes involving guns to
be worthy of harsher treatment in sentencing than crimes involving
other weapons. First, the Commission often sets the highest weapon
enhancement for "discharging a firearm."153 Further, other graduated
enhancement schedules in the Guidelines set harsher sentences for
crimes involving firearms than for crimes involving other weapons.154
The Commission devoted an entire section of the Guidelines exclu-

150. See supra Section I.A tbl.l.
151. That is, he receives the same sentence assuming the pistol-whipping does not seri
ously injure the victim. See supra Section I.B.l tbl.2.
152. While this Note does not attempt to draw the line between "inherently dangerous"
and "non-inherently dangerous" weapons, see supra note 31, weapons like bombs, grenades,
and automatic weapons probably qualify as inherently dangerous. They serve no purpose
other than violence. A chair, a hammer, a tennis racket, or even a kitchen knife have inher
ent uses other than violence, and may be used in the heat of the moment in a way that a gun
or a bomb probably cannot be so used. This section discusses legislative intent with regard to
guns as a clear example of an inherently dangerous weapon.
153. See, e.g., USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A); USSG § 2Ll.l(b)(4)(A) (the Guideline provi
sion for Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien sets the highest en
hancement "if a firearm was discharged").
154. See, e.g., USSG § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A), Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious
Damage (setting up a graduated enhancement schedule whereby the harshest penalty, an
increase of seven points, corresponds to firearm discharge, a six point increase when a fire
arm is "otl!erwise used," a five point increase when a firearm was brandished, displayed, or
possessed, a four point increase when a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, and a three
point increase when a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed); The
Robbery graduated enhancement schedule makes it even clearer that the Commission views
firearm use as a crime worthy of harsher punishment than the use of other weapons. See
USSG § 2B3.l(b)(2)(A) (if a firearm was discharged, add 7 points; if a firearm was otherwise
used, add 6 points; if a firearm was brandished, displayed or possessed, add 5 points; if a
dangerous weapon was otherwise used, add 4 points; if a dangerous weapon was brandished,
displayed, or possessed, add 3 points).
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sively to firearms.155 Also, the Commission sets enhancements for
Armed Career Criminals based on a defendant's use or possession of
firearms, not other weapons.156
Furthermore, the use of a gun suggests premeditation, unlike the
use of a chair,157 and the Commission makes crimes involving premedi
tation worthy of harsher sentences than crimes lacking premedita
tion.158 Presumably, an attacker who used a gun planned to carry a
gun. He intended to pull the gun · out with the intent to involve that
gun in the assault to do bodily harm. Dorothy, wielding a gun, should
not receive the same sentence as David, who did not carry a gun into
the fray, who did not pull out a gun in order to involve it in the assault,
and who did not use a gun with the intent to inflict bodily harm. David
grabbed the first object available to him, a chair.
Apart from the Guidelines, as demonstrated by the many bills in
Congress seeking to promote gun control and safety,159 legislators view
gun violence, and the potential for gun violence, as a major concern160
155. See USSG § 2K2, Offenses Involving Public Safety. For an example of the way the
Commission views firearm involvement in crime, see USSG § 2K2.l. Under this section, the
Commission sets base offense levels for unlawful receipt, possession, or transportation of
firearms or ammunition and prohibited transactions involving firearms or ammunition when
the crimes involve certain specific types of firearms. See USSG§ 2K2.l(a). The Commission
further sets increases in points based on the number of firearms that were involved in the
crime. See USSG § 2K2.l(b)(l). Further, under the guideline for Possession of Firearm or
Dangerous Weapon in Federal Facility; Possession or Discharge of Firearm in School Zone,
USSG§ 2K2.5, the Commission includes a specific offense characteristic where a "defendant
unlawfully possessed or caused any firearm to be present in a school zone." USSG §
2K2.S(b)( l)(B). There is no similar enhancement for possessing other dangerous weapons in
a school zone.
156. See USSG§§ 4B l.4(b)(3)(A), 4B l.4(c)(2).
157. See supra note 31 (discussing the role of premeditation).
158. See, e.g., USSG § 2Al.1, cmt. n.l. The Commission concludes in the application
notes to the first degree murder guideline that "in the absence of capital punishment life im
prisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditated killing."
159. See, e.g., S. 1190, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill to apply the Consumer Product Safety
Act to firearms and ammunition) (introduced in Senate June 9, 1999); American Handgun
Standards Act of 1999, H.R. 2009, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 193, 106th Cong. (1999); Violent
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, S. 254, 106th
Cong. (1999); The Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 1768, 106th Cong.
(1999); S. 995, 106th Cong. (1999); The Firearm Heritage Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1032,
106th Cong. (1999); New Millennium Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 899, 106th Cong.
(1999); The Children Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1342, 106th Cong. (1999).
160. There are no comparable bills in Congress relating to the use of inherently non
dangerous weapons such as chairs or hammers. There are many laws regarding the use of
motorized vehicles which are often the weapons that defendants use to commit aggravated
assault with an inherently non-dangerous weapon, and for which these same defendants re
ceive double counted sentences for "otherwise using" the vehicle. See, e.g. , United States v.
Morris, 131 F.3d 1136 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992). These laws, however, are not aimed at
the vehicles potentially used to commit intentional acts of violence such as aggravated as
sault, rather they are laws aimed at curtailing the danger that comes from accidents and mis
use. For some examples of bills currently being debated in Congress relating to automobiles,
see Auto Safety Assurance Act of 1999, H.R. 3153, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Carrier Safety
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and view crimes involving guns to be particularly harmful to society.
For instance, Congress has spent much energy debating gun control
bills. In less than a year, Congress has debated at least eight bills di
rectly pertaining to gun control and safety.161
Federal legislators, the Commission, and others have demonstrated
that a goal of sentencing is proportionality. One way for courts to meet
the goal of proportionality in sentencing is to refrain from double
counting as applied in the context of defendants who commit aggra
vated assault with inherently nondangerous weapons.
CONCLUSION

As evidenced in Littleton, Colorado,162 gone are the days when
kids merely throw fists or sticks and stones in the schoolyard. The law
should punish less severely those who choose to stay away from inher
ently dangerous weapons like guns and punish those who use guns to
commit aggravated assaults. Legislators advocate a harsher punish
ment for offenders who use violent weapons than those who throw
sticks or stones, or even those who use baseball bats. Consequently,
courts should sentence offenders who attack with chairs to shorter
prison terms than offenders who attack with guns.
The aggravated assault Guideline has a graduated structure on its
face and metes out graduated sentences when applied to aggravated
assaults with inherently dangerous weapons. When the base offense
level is enhanced under any of the special offense characteristics in
section 2A2.2(b )(2), the court does not double count a single factor.
The graduated enhancement schedule, however, falls apart in struc
ture and purpose when a defendant who commits an aggravated as
sault with an inherently nondangerous weapon such as a chair is given
an enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon. The en
hancement double counts the defendant's use or threatened use of the
weapon.
Applied double counting is impermissible because the Commission
did not intend its graduated enhancement schedule to fall apart upon
application, therefore, the Commission did not intend the double
counting as applied. Further, just because the Commission prohibited
double counting elsewhere in the Guidelines does not lead to the con
clusion that double counting in this instance is permissible. Finally,

Act of 1999, H.R. 2679, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,
S. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999).
161. See supra note 159.
162. On April 20, 1999, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, two students at Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado opened fire on their classmates killing 12 students, one
teacher, and themselves. Tom Kenworthy, Big Bomb Found in School, Police Think 2 Gun
men May Have Been Helped, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at 3.
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even if courts find that double counting is permissible they should re
sist it. To resist it promotes the Commission's goals of uniformity and
fairness. Further, due to the ambiguity created by applied double
counting, courts should err on the side of lenity in sentencing. Finally,
courts should resist double counting because Congress deems crimes
involving inherently dangerous weapons such as guns more dangerous
than crimes with chairs. If courts hold that attacking with a gun and at
tacking with a chair garner the same punishment, they undermine
Congress' goal of proportionality in sentencing and the public's sense
of justice.
Instead of engaging in applied double counting, courts faced with
an offender who qualified for the aggravated assault provision of the
Guidelines through the use of an inherently nondangerous weapon
should refuse to apply the second enhancement "when a dangerous
weapon was otherwise used." Instead, courts should sentence such of
fenders only for the base offense level.

